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Abstract
Bruce and Young (198 6) proposed a model in which the 
recall of information associated with a person is a 
sequential process. Burton and Bruce (1992) asserts, 
however, that the recall of this information is 
positively related to the amount of mental associations 
between the face and this information. Different 
categories of information, including Occupations, 
Sports, Hometowns, Names and Numbers were used, and the 
usage frequency of the words within each category was 
varied. This biographical information was presented 
with 16 different male faces to 33 male subjects. The 
faces alone were presented on recall trials. As 
predicted, there were main effects for Frequency and 
Information category. There was also a significant 
association between the recall of Names and/or 
Extension Numbers with the recall of other information. 
These findings are not adequately explained by the 
Burton and Bruce (1992) model and thus modifications 
must be made.
The Effects of Word Frequency on the 
Recall of Information Associated With a Face
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Introduction 
During a single day, people encounter an 
overwhelming amount of visual information about 
physical objects. In fact, each object perceived by an 
individual is different, whether in actual appearance 
or in the contextual surroundings, from all other 
objects in the environment. If each of these entities 
were perceived as being unique, a person's mental 
capacity would be greatly overloaded. In addition, if 
each entity had it's own distinct name, language would 
be tremendously complex and virtually impossible (Smith 
& Medin, 1981). Fortunately, humans have the capacity 
to form concepts that help them make sense of the 
infinite amount of sensory information that they 
encounter.
Concept Formation
In essence a concept is a pattern-recognition 
device. A concept is a mental representation, or 
semantic code, of an entity that enables a person to 
recognize other objects that are similar. People 
recognize that an object conforms to a concept by 
comparing the salient attributes of the physical object
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to the attributes in the semantic code of the concept. 
These attributes vary both in their qualitative 
properties (e.g. legs, wooden, can sit upon it) and in 
their quantitative, or dimensional, properties (e.g. 
size) (Mervis & Rosch, 1981) . In this way, people 
recognize an object as a chair, and not as a novel 
entity, by the similarity of that object's attributes 
to the qualitative attributes of their mental 
representation of a chair. Often dimensional 
attributes and more detailed qualitative features are 
also used to recognize differences between two 
conceptually similar objects. For example, by 
attending to these detailed features, people are able 
to distinguish an armchair from a school desk, and by 
attending to dimensional attributes people are able to 
distinguish an adult man from an adolescent.
If, however, a novel object is encountered, the 
visual features of the object are processed by the 
person, and a new concept is developed. The semantic 
code of this new concept contains only the features of 
the object that was first encountered. This code is 
then shaped by subsequent encounters with conceptually
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similar objects. The features of these objects are 
processed and the semantic code is constantly altered 
so that a useful concept is available. In this way, 
people observe and recognize stimuli that have not 
previously been experienced. People then acquire a 
label for the newly formed concept either by learning 
it from external sources, or by attaching their own 
original label to the concept.
Once recognition of an object has taken place, a 
person is then able to access the label associated with 
the object. Researchers have found that accessing the 
label of a familiar visual stimulus can not take place 
immediately upon perception, but is delayed until 
recognition of the stimulus takes place (Nelson, Reed & 
McEvoy, 1977; Kroll & Potter, 1984; Potter & Faulconer, 
1975). Potter and Faulconer (1975) propose that the 
visual stimulus must first be processed by the semantic 
node of the concept before the label node can be 
accessed. Thus to label any physical object 
encountered in the environment, a person must first 
recognize the object.
Person Identification
The Effects of
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As social beings, it is important for people to 
recognize not only objects but also people that are 
common to their environment. In addition to needing to 
recognize another person as familiar, people need to be 
able to recall the label, or name, of that individual. 
Similar to object recognition and identification, a 
person must first be recognized before he/she can be 
named. Many features are attended to when perceiving 
and attempting to recognize an individual. Some of 
these features include the height, sex and weight of 
the individual, and the location of the interaction.
But "by far the most powerful means of recognition is 
by perceiving, storing and retrieving aspects of facial 
configuration" (Clifford and Bull, 1978, p. 71).
Most research on people's ability to remember 
faces has been confined to three distinct areas. The 
most basic form of face memory is face recognition.
Face recognition is the ability of a person to 
"recognize a face as one that you have seen before" 
(Cohen, 1989, p.88). Some of this research is confined 
to the ability of people to recognize pictures of 
famous people among other non-famous distractors
The Effects of
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(Young, Hay, McWeeny, Flude & Ellis, 1985; Malone, 
Morris, Kay & Levin, 1982). Other research in face 
recognition is often performed with brain-damaged 
individuals, (Flude, Ellis and Kay, 1989; DeRenzi, 
Bonacini and Faglioni, 1989) and the aged (Maylor,
1990; Cohen and Faulkner, 1984). Face recall, on the 
other hand, is the ability of people to form a mental 
image of the target face and describe this face 
verbally (Cohen, 1989). Face recall and face 
recognition are both important in situations involving 
crimes in which a victim or bystander is asked to 
describe or point out a suspect. Indeed, Greene and 
Loftus (1984) propose that, since eye-witness testimony 
is such an important, yet misunderstood aspect of the 
law, psychologists should "testify during the trial 
about factors of perception and memory that could 
affect a witnesses accuracy" (p. 395). Face 
identification, however, involves a slight twist of the 
previous two types of memory for faces. "Face 
identification entails being able to look at a person's 
face and tell who it is; being able to tell a person's 
name or some detail about the person..." (Cohen, 1989,
The Effects of
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p . 88 ) .
Some of the research in the area of face 
identification have included diary studies of subject's 
everyday problems identifying people and faces (Yarmey, 
1973; Young, Hay and Ellis, 1985). Yarmey investigated 
the "Tip of the Tongue" (TOT) phenomenon. In this 
study, the participants reported that they experienced 
this phenomenon when they were able to recognize a 
face, but were unable to immediately name or identify 
it, and felt that they were on the verge of doing so. 
Yarmey's participants most often experienced this state 
when they were trying to recall a persons name. In 
trying to overcome this "tip of the tongue" feeling, 
the participants described their attempts to recall the 
name by pooling all the information known about the 
target person. "Ss in TOT states searched for target's 
name by locating first his profession, where he was 
most often seen, and how recently" (p. 287).
This strategy of Yarmey's participants led many 
researchers to question what information is associated 
with the mental images of people and faces. Some of 
the first work in this area was concerned wi th
The Effects of
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contextual elaboration and face recognition (Kerr & 
Winograd, 1982; Honeck, 1986). In one study Kerr and 
Winograd (1982) found that "it is easier to recognize 
the face of a person about whom you have been given 
some personal information than a face you have examined 
without any accompanying information" (p.607). The 
accompanying personal information included personality 
characteristics, hobbies and, again, professions.
Because of these findings, studies were performed 
to show how this information is associated with the 
mental representations of faces. In addition, the 
accuracy of recall of these different types of 
information relative to each other also became of 
interest. Young, Hay and Ellis (1985) noted that 
people can often remember a person's occupation and not 
that person's name, but that the converse is rarely, if 
ever, true. They concluded that names were much harder 
to recall than occupations. Indeed, much of the 
research in this area provided evidence that the 
occupation, or some other relevant information about 
the target person had to be accessed before the name of 
the person could be recalled (Young, McWeeny, Hay &
The Effects of
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Ellis, 1986). This theory is in agreement with 
Yarmey's (1973) study initially discussed in which 
Yarmey states that "in trying to remember a person's 
name, or at least a famous person's name, Ss first try 
to locate his profession..." (p. 288).
These findings compelled researchers into 
developing theories concerning the type of information, 
and the method of its association with the concept of a 
person or a face. In particular, theorists tried to 
explain why people's occupations were more readily 
recalled than their names. An initial hypothesis on 
this phenomenon was that everyday life provides people 
with contextual cues about occupation. Another 
hypothesis was that people do not need to recall names 
with anything like the frequency that they must recall 
other semantic information, such as occupation, about 
people (McWeeny, Young, Hay & Ellis, 1987). In 
addition to these hypotheses, others produced theories 
based on cognitive processing.
Through their research, Morton, Hammersley and 
Beckerian (1985) developed the Headed Records Model.
The Headed Records Model asserts that information is
The Effects of
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held in memory units, or records, which can only be 
accessed by a particular key, or heading. Morton et 
al. proposed that any information can function as a 
heading, and use the name of a person as an example of 
a common heading. They also assert that, although this 
heading is used to access the record, the heading 
itself cannot be retrieved. The information held in 
the heading can only be recalled if it is also held in 
the records. This was the theoretical explanation of 
how a person can remember information about another but 
not that person's name. There was, however, research 
that contradicted this model (McWeeny, Young, Hay, & 
Ellis, 1987).
To counter the Headed Records Model of Morton et 
al., Young, McWeeny, Ellis and Hay conducted a series 
of experiments on "Naming and Categorizing Faces and 
Written Names" (1986). In these studies, Young et al. 
had participants first categorize a set of famous 
faces, among distractor non-famous faces, as either 
familiar or not familiar. Next the participants were 
to say whether they recognized a set of famous names 
from among non-famous names. Participants were then
The Effects of
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asked to identify (name) another set of famous faces 
from amongst distractors. And finally, the
participants were asked to read aloud a set of written
names. Young et al. found that overall "subjects were
able to name aloud written names faster than
photographs of faces, but were able to classify faces 
on familiarity or occupation faster than written names. 
Faces were categorized faster than they were named, but 
written names were spoken faster than they could be 
categorized" (p.297). From these results, Young et al. 
concluded that "name codes can only be accessed from 
familiar faces via an intervening identity-semantic 
code, whereas names can access identity specific 
semantic codes and name codes in parallel" (p.316).
That is, Young et al. felt that people can recognize or 
recall a name for a face only after retrieving some 
relevant information, or the name itself, of the target 
person. They also felt that these results help explain 
"everyday errors in which people often find that they 
can recall a seen person's occupation but not her or 
his name, yet never find that they can recall a 
person's name but not her or his occupation" (p. 316).
The Effects of
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Human Face Processing System
Supported by these findings, Bruce and Young 
(1986) developed their own theory of face recognition. 
In Bruce and Young's theory, called the Human Face 
Processing System, recognition and recall of a person 
is a graded cognitive process with levels, or units, of 
recognition (Cohen, 1989). This recognition can occur 
through any number of modalities, including speech and 
smell, but was most easily achieved through face 
recognition.
The first unit of recognition is the Face 
Recognition Unit. In this cognitive processing unit, 
the mental representation, or concept, of a person's 
face is stored. It is this level that is activated 
when a previously seen face is encountered again. This 
activation occurs through the matching of the target 
facial features with the face recognition units 
contained within the node. When a successful match has 
been made, the observer feels that the target face is 
familiar.
The second level of the model is the Person 
Identity Node. In this level, certain relevant
The Effects of
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information pertaining to the target person are stored. 
Some of the person's identity specific information 
could be describing his or her occupation, who the 
person's friends are, what the persons hobbies are, 
where he or she is usually encountered, and so on.
This level of recall, however, cannot be accessed until 
the first level of processing, the Face Recognition 
Unit, is activated. That is, an observer cannot recall 
information relevant to a person that he or she has 
seen until the appearance of the target person is 
recognized.
The third level of this model is the unit that 
contains additional information about the target 
person, in particular, his or her name. Bruce and 
Young call this level the Name Generation Node. Again, 
however, the information in this node cannot be 
accessed until the preceding level of processing, the 
Person Identity Node, is activated. That is, an 
observer cannot name a person that he or she has seen 
until some kind of relevant personal information of the 
target person is recalled. The process of activating 
the Person Identity Node does not have to be
The Effects of
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intentionally undertaken by the individual seeking the 
name (although it is often done intentionally; Yarmey, 
1973) .
To counter this model, Cohen and Faulkner (198 6), 
hypothesized that names of people were more difficult 
to recall than occupations because a person's name is 
more arbitrary. Cohen and Faulkner define 
arbitrariness as being equivalent to Katz's (1972) 
definition of token reference. Katz asserts that a 
noun has token reference to an concept when the same 
noun can be used to refer to many different concepts. 
That is, while the word doctor conjures the same 
concept in most people, the word John means something 
different to each person. Thus, while there may be 
contextual and appearance cues that aid recall of 
occupations, names are only arbitrarily related to 
their referents.
McWeeny, Young, Hay and Ellis (1987) performed an 
experiment attempting to test these contrasting 
predictions. To accomplish this, McWeeny et al. 
attempted to control any and all artifacts that might 
contribute to subjects recalling occupations more
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efficiently than names. First, McWeeny et al. asserted 
that one possibility as to why this occurs in everyday 
life was that people are provided with a variety of 
non-facial contextual cues as to occupation, but not to 
name. McWeeny et al. tried to control for this 
artifact by presenting photographs of faces surrounded 
by a closely fitting circular template to remove as 
many non-facial cues as possible. McWeeny et al. also 
suggested that names could be harder to recall because 
they are not retrieved, heard, and spoken with anything 
like the frequency that other information, like 
occupations. And finally, McWeeny et al. cite Cohen 
and Faulkner's (198 6) argument that names are more 
difficult to recall because they are words with low 
meaningfulness and imageability. McWeeny et al. 
attempted to control for these artifacts by using a set 
of names and occupations that were identical words.
That is, they employed such words as Baker and Cook 
that are commonly used as both names and occupations. 
Thus, as they argued, these words, whether used as 
names or occupations, have the same frequency of usage 
and same meaningfulness, because they are the same
The Effects of
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words.
McWeeny et al. used this set of ambiguous words 
(e.g. Baker, Cook) as half of the stimuli used, while 
the other half consisted of unambiguous names (e.g. 
Knowles, Rothwell) and unambiguous occupations (e.g. 
grocer, architect). The results of this experiment 
showed that the occupations associated with the faces 
were recalled without names more frequently than names 
were recalled without occupations. (It is important to 
remember that there were, however, a few occasions when 
this outcome did occur.) The results also showed that 
ambiguous occupations were recalled far more frequently 
than ambiguous names. (This phenomenon was subsequently 
termed the "Baker-baker paradox"). McWeeny et al. 
asserted that "surnames are harder to recall than 
occupations regardless of the order that the items are 
learnt and regardless of their ambiguity or lack of 
ambiguity" (p.146). They also concluded that these 
results provided convincing evidence for the Human Face 
Processing System.
Other studies have also provided support for the 
Bruce and Young model (Hanley and Cowell, 1988; Flude,
The Effects of
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Ellis and Kay, 1989; Brenner, Baguley, Bright and 
Bruce, 1990). In a series of experiments performed by 
Hanley and Cowell (1988), the effectiveness of 
different cues on the recall of the names of famous 
people was tested. Some of these cues were additional 
photographs of the celebrity, biographical information 
about the celebrity, or the celebrity's initials. The 
effectiveness of showing a second photograph and the 
effectiveness of just repeating the same photo were 
also compared. The results showed that the initials 
were effective only if the subject knew the occupation 
of the celebrity "because it helped them bridge the gap 
between the contextual information in the person- 
specific semantic system and the name in the lexical 
output system" (p.548). The biographical information 
was helpful only if the subjects had found the face 
familiar, and not if they already knew some 
biographical information about the celebrity. And 
finally, the additional viewing of the celebrity was 
helpful only if the subject had originally not found 
the face familiar. In this study, however, 
participants found the face to be familiar and gave the
The Effects of
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right name but could not initially recall the 
occupation on 2 0 occasions. Hanley and Cowell 
concluded that these results "generally support the 
view that successive, but distinct stages are involved 
in face recognition, consistent with the model put 
forward by Bruce and Young (1986)" (p.545).
Flude, Ellis and Kay (1989) described a case study 
and a set of experiments performed with an individual 
who suffered aphasic brain damage resulting in anomia, 
or the clinical difficulty in naming objects and ideas. 
Flude et al. presented this individual with the faces 
of 60 persons of varying familiarity. The anomic 
aphasic was able to name only 3 of the 40 familiar 
faces. He was, however able to recognize 3 4 of them 
and provide semantic descriptions of 30. Flude et al. 
asserted that this pattern of response is explained in 
"terms of either impairment to name generation itself 
or the partial disconnection of that component from the 
person identity nodes" (p.70) as a result of his tumor 
and subsequent operation. Flude et al. conclude that 
these findings "challenge models which propose that 
names are stored alongside semantic information in a
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general-purpose long-term store" (p. 60).
In a series of studies, Cohen (1986) again 
proposed a theory countering the Human Face Processing 
System. Cohen acknowledged McWeeny, Young, Hay and 
Ellis' (1987) attempt to control some of the variables 
that might contribute to making occupations easier to 
recall, but asserted that other characteristics of 
names, aside from those addressed by McWeeny et al. 
could be the cause of their recall difficulty.
Referring to Katz (1972), Cohen argues that names are 
more difficult to recall because "proper names have 
only token reference and not type reference. Other 
biographical information...is rich in connotative 
meaning, and is linked to an elaborate semantic network 
of interconnected items so that multiple routes to 
retrieval are available" (p.289).
In the first experiment, Cohen tested this 
hypothesis by presenting faces along with names, 
occupations and possessions, to subjects. Half of the 
possessions were actually non-words created by the 
experimenter, and half of the possessions were actual 
objects that could be owned by an individual. The
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results for the non-word condition showed that names 
and non-words were equivalent in terms of recall. The 
results also revealed that occupations and real-word 
possessions were recalled about equally, and that both 
were recalled better than names. Cohen did note, 
however, that remembering occupation was a virtual 
precondition of recalling either names or real-word 
possessions.
In the second study, Cohen attempted to test the 
effect of meaningfulness of both names and occupations 
on their subsequent recall. In this study, she refers 
to McWeeny et al. (1987) study, but argues that the 
study does not convincingly show that the 
meaningfulness of the words has no effect. Cohen 
asserts that Baker-baker paradox can be explained by 
the encoding strategies of the participants. Using as 
an example the hypothetical "Mr. Baker, who is a 
lawyer," Cohen argues that "if the name...is encoded 
meaningfully, this produces a conflicting 
representation of an individual who is both a baker and 
a lawyer" (p.293). Cohen argues that participants 
might be avoiding this conflict by not encoding the
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name as a meaningful word. Cohen also suggest that the 
use of both ambiguous (e.g. Baker) and non-ambiguous 
(e.g. Higgins) could also have discouraged the 
participants from encoding the former as meaningful.
In the experiment itself, subjects again viewed faces 
accompanied by both names and occupations. Half of the 
names were ambiguous and meaningful (e.g. Baker), and 
half were ambiguous and meaningless (e.g. Ryman). A 
third of the occupations were ambiguous and meaningful 
(e.g. baker), a third were unambiguous and meaningful 
(e.g. lawyer), and a third were ambiguous and 
meaningless (e.g. ryman). The results of this 
experiment revealed that ambiguous-meaningful names 
(e.g. Baker) were recalled more than meaningless- 
ambiguous occupations (e.g. ryman). Meaningless names 
and meaningless occupations were recalled about 
equally. But again a meaningful occupation was 
recalled more when it was paired with meaningless or a 
meaningful name. Cohen concluded that "it is the 
meaningfulness of an item, rather than the slot that it 
occupies, that determines how easy it is to recall" (p. 
294), Cohen also declares that "in everyday life it is
The Effects of
22
clear that names are always treated as meaningless. 
People habitually ignore whatever meanings names do 
have..." (p.295). Cohen proposes a new, modified 
version of the Bruce and Young model, suggesting that 
it is possible that "meaningful information is stored 
at the person identity node and is accessed first; 
meaningless information is stored at outlying nodes and 
can only be accessed from the person identity node"
(p.295).
Interactive-Activation Model
Burton and Bruce (1992) have since attempted to 
produce a revised version of the Human Face Processing 
System. Burton and Bruce base this account upon the 
Interactive Activation and Competition model of 
McClelland, Rumelhart and others (cited in Burton & 
Bruce, 1992). These models are comprised of a number 
of units organized into pools. The units within these 
pools are connected by bi-directional inhibitory links, 
while the pools are connected by bi-directional 
excitatory links. In the models, activation, either 
internal or external, is passed along between the pools 
by the excitatory links, while decay is caused by the
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inhibitory links. Burton and Bruce have combined the 
Interactive Activation and Competition model with the 
Human Face Processing System. They suggest that the 
Face Recognition Unit activates the Person Identity 
Node through its excitatory links with the Person 
Identity Node. Burton and Bruce contend that it is 
within the Person Identity Node that recognition 
occurs. Burton and Bruce propose that when a Person 
Identity Node is activated, it activates a Semantic 
Information Unit. This Semantic Information Unit will 
then in turn activate any other Semantic Information 
Unit and Person Identity Node with which it is linked. 
This continues until the decay caused by the inhibitory 
links weakens the excitation level below that of 
threshold.
Burton and Bruce (1992) also propose that names 
and biographical information are both contained in the 
Semantic Information Unit pools. Burton and Bruce 
contend that if each Person Identity Node is attached 
to all its associated Semantic Information Units, some 
units will have more connections to Person Identity 
Nodes than others. In particular, most name units will
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have only one connection, as a result of their 
uniqueness. Burton and Bruce then "propose that it is 
precisely because of the shared nature of much semantic 
information, and the isolation of names, that the 
difficulty in naming arises. Many SIUs will have more 
than one unit to bolster their activation, whereas 
names (in most cases) have a single connected unit" (p. 
49) .
Burton and Bruce (1992) assert that this model 
predicts the results that have been obtained in 
previous research not only more accurately but also 
more parsimoniously then the Human Face Processing 
System. They support this assertion by pointing to the 
instances in the previous studies in which names were 
recalled prior to occupations. Unlike the Human Face 
Processing System, the Interactive Activation and 
Competition model not only allows such results, but 
actually predicts their occurrence. Burton and Bruce 
also discuss the case study of the anomic-aphasic 
(Flude, Kay and Ellis, 1989). They argue that the 
responses of this individual can not be evidence for 
the Human Face Processing System because if the Name
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Generation Node had been damaged or disconnected, the 
individual would have recalled no names.
Burton and Bruce (1992) also discuss the parallels 
between this model and that of Cohen's, stating that 
"the uniqueness of a semantic unit will often be 
associated with its meaningfulness" (p. 57). Burton 
and Bruce assert, however, that their Interactive 
Activation and Competition model should be preferred 
because it not only "provides a much more detailed 
account of the phenomenon than the Cohen model." And, 
unlike the Bruce and Young model, they argue that it 
does so "from relatively simple assumptions", and is 
"couched in terms of a model which has already been 
shown to explain many phenomenon of face recognition" 
(p. 57).
In a study that supported the Burton and Bruce 
model, Vittoria (1992) varied the meaningfulness and 
arbitrariness of the information that was associated 
with a face. In this study slides of faces were 
presented accompanied by biographical information. The 
participants were asked to recall as much of this 
accompanying information on subsequent viewing as
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possible. The information used, which included 
occupations, sports, hometowns, names, and numbers, 
varied in its meaningfulness and arbitrariness relative 
to person identification. Occupation was judged to 
have the highest amount of meaning and was least 
arbitrary, and was thus expected to be recalled most 
frequently. Names were considered less meaningful and 
were expected to be recalled less frequently than 
occupations. Hometowns and sports were judged to have 
levels of meaningfulness between those of occupations 
and names and somewhat equal to each other. Thus these 
two types of categories were expected to be recalled 
more than names but less than occupations. Numbers 
were argued to have the least meaning and to be most 
arbitrary, and were thus predicted to be recalled least 
of all. In addition, the author made the prediction, 
stemming from the modified Human Face Processing System 
of Cohen (1990), that no name or number would be 
recalled on a trial without some more meaningful piece 
of information.
The results of this study confirmed most of these 
hypotheses. Occupations were recalled most frequently,
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followed by hometowns and sports (in a virtual tie). 
Names were recalled less than sports and hometowns 
while numbers were remembered least of all, and 
provided a convenient baseline for the study. Names 
and numbers were rarely recalled without more 
meaningful information on most trials, with the 
exception of trial 2, in which this ratio did not reach 
statistical significance.
There were, however, certain limitations to this 
study. One consideration was that the level of 
meaningfulness of the information stimuli was not 
exactly known. Judgements were made using opinion and 
inference alone. A second limitation was that there 
was an eventual ceiling effect on the learning of the 
biographical information. This ceiling effect caused 
the typical recall pattern to be distorted in the later 
trials.
Overall, however, this study provided support for 
the Interactive Activation and Competition model of 
Burton and Bruce (1992). As discussed, the recall of 
the different types of information seemed to be on a 
continuum, being highest with occupation and declining
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steadily to a minimum with numbers. This pattern of 
recall was much different than the one that would have 
been predicted by the Human Face Processing System.
The Human Face Processing System would have predicted 
that all semantic information would have been recalled 
at a high rate with a severe drop-off in the rate of 
recall for names and numbers. Additionally, there were 
instances in which names and numbers were recalled 
without other semantic information, although less than 
expected by chance. Again this result was consistent 
with the predictions that would have been made from the 
Interactive Activation and Competition model and not 
from the Human Face Processing System.
In an attempt to explain the results more 
accurately, Vittoria preceded to propose a theory of 
face recognition in which the information is arranged 
categorically. Although this theory differs slightly 
from the Burton and Bruce model, it is indeed very 
similar. Vittoria states that "categories based on 
commonly shared attributes, such as an occupation, 
would be larger, while a category based on less 
commonly shared attributes, such as a particular name,
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are smaller. The larger the category, the more easily 
the label is accessed" (p.36) Indeed, if category is 
translated as a Semantic Information Unit pool, and the 
size of the category as the number of excitatory links, 
these theories are virtually identical.
Present Study
The study reported here was performed in order to 
provide conclusive evidence that would distinguish the 
more appropriate model of face identification. This 
study was based on a proposal made by Burton and Bruce 
(1992) that the frequency of exposure to a word could 
be used as an indirect measure of the strength of the 
associational links. Similar to the previous study, 
this study varied the meaningfulness of the categories 
of information used. Additionally, however, the 
information within each category varied as to its 
frequency of usage, as reported by Kucera and Francis 
(1967) and Battig and Montague (1969).
In general, it was expected that the higher the 
frequency of exposure to a word, the better the recall. 
This hypothesis is made based on not only the 
Interactive Activation and Competition model of Burton
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and Bruce (1992), but also on converging evidence, 
stemming from general verbal learning studies 
(Underwood & Schulz, 1960), and other studies with 
anomic aphasics (Goodglass, 1980; Wepman, Bock, Jones 
& Van Pelt, 1973). In their description of the Spew 
Hypothesis, Underwood and Schulz (19 60) stated that 
"the more frequent a verbal unit has been experienced, 
the more quickly will this become a response in a new 
associative connection" (p.86).
Similar to the previous study performed by 
Vittoria (1992), it is hypothesized that the more 
meaningful categories (occupations, sports and 
hometowns) will be recalled more accurately. Thus it 
is predicted that the high-frequency words in each 
category will be recalled more than the low-frequency 
words within that category. Because of the advantage 
in recall of the meaningful words, it is predicted that 
the high-frequency names will be recalled less than the 
high-frequency words in the meaningful categories, but 
more than the low frequency words of those categories 
(i.e. John will be recalled more often than welder, but 
not than doctor or farmer). Thus high frequency
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Occupations are expected to be recalled most 
accurately, followed by high frequency Sports and 
Hometowns, and then high frequency Names. Low 
frequency Occupations are expected to be recalled less 
than high frequency Names but more than low frequency 
Sports which are expected to be recalled more than 
Hometowns and then Names. Extension Numbers are 
predicted to be recalled the least accurately.
Unlike the previous experiment, however, it is 
hypothesized that the recall of names and numbers will 
not be dependent upon the recall of the more meaningful 
information. It is argued that, in the previous study, 
there was an artifact in that the retrieval of the more 
meaningful information provided cues that allowed for 
the subsequent recall of Names. In this study, 
however, since high frequency Names will be recalled 
more accurately than the other Types of Information of 
low frequency, it is asserted that there will be no 
inadvertent cues provided for the recall of Names.
Thus, it is predicted the number of Name and/or 
Extension Number only responses will be no different 
than would be expected by chance.
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Method
Pilot Study
Prior to the face identification study, a pilot 
study was conducted for the purpose of selecting the 
stimuli for use in the main study. Ten male subjects 
were asked to perform two tasks. They were first asked 
to separate 64 photographs of men into sixteen 
different groups depending upon the similarity of their 
appearance. These photographs were black and white, 
and were of unfamiliar men. Each slide shows the whole 
head in a full-face pose, with no accompanying 
background. The second task involved the subjects 
rating their familiarity with twenty words in each of 
the four information categories used: Occupations, 
Sports, Cities and men's first Names. These words were 
of equal length and number of syllables. This task was 
designed as a check upon the frequency ratings as 
provided by Battig and Montague (1969).
Analysis of the patterns of groupings was 
performed and the 16 most dissimilar faces were chosen 
for use in the main study (Appendix A). Additionally, 
the eight words from each categorv rated as most
The Effects of
33
familiar were used as the High Frequency words of the 
category, while the eight words rated as least familiar 
were used as the Low Frequency words (Appendix B).
Main Study 
Subjects
The participants consisted of 3 3 male individuals 
who were enlisted from the Introductory Psychology 
subject pool. These participants received course 
credit in return for their participation.
Materials
The 16 faces selected by means of the pilot study 
were used as the visual stimuli in the study while the 
words that were rated as most and least representative 
of their category was used as the biographical 
information. Additionally, 16 two digit numbers were 
chosen to be used as the Extension Number stimuli. 
Extension Numbers, however, were not varied in regard 
to frequency.
Procedure
Experimental sessions were conducted for groups of 
participants. These groups consisted of no more than 
ten participants. The participants were seated facing
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a screen onto which the slides of faces were projected.
Each face was be shown for 3 0 seconds, while the 
accompanying biographical information was presented. 
This information was read to the subjects in the 
following manner: "This is Richard from Boston. He is
a teacher who likes football. His extension number is 
63." The different aspects of the biographical 
information were presented in a varied and balanced 
order (e.g. another slide was accompanied with "This 
man likes croquet and is a lawyer. His name is Alvard 
and his extension number is 27. He is from Polton.")
The participants were instructed to memorize each 
face and the accompanying facts. They were told that 
all facts were equally important.
Following this "introduction" to the stimuli, only 
the faces were presented to the participants. The 
participants were asked to recall all of the 
biographical information that originally accompanied 
each face. Guessing was encouraged. The subjects were 
asked to write the recalled information, in the order 
that it was recalled, on an answer sheet provided for 
this purpose. All sixteen faces were shown, and were
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presented in random order. Following each recall 
trial, the faces and facts were re-presented. Four 
more re-introduction and recall trials followed for a 
total of five trials.
Results
The design of the study required that the first 
hypothesis be tested using two separate repeated- 
measures MANOVAs. The two MANOVAs were performed 
because the Extension Number category was not divided 
by frequency. Thus the first MANOVA analyzed the data 
with regard to two independent variables: Information
Type, which had five levels, and Trial, which also had 
five levels. The second MANOVA analyzed the data with 
regard to three independent variables: Information
Type, which for this analysis only had four levels, 
Trial, and Frequency, which had two levels. The 
dependent variable for both MANOVAs was the number of 
correct responses. Additionally, planned orthogonal 
contrasts and post-hoc T-Tests using the Bonferroni 
adjustment were calculated to determine the relative 
rank of the nine different Information Type/Frequency 
combinations,- also determined by the number of correct
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responses.
To test the significance of the second hypothesis, 
the frequency of Name and/or Extension Number only 
responses expected by chance were calculated for each 
of the 16 slides. These expected frequencies were 
compared to the actual observed frequency of this type 
of response on the appropriate slide to determine if 
this response occurred more or less than expected for 
the slide. A sign test was performed to test the 
significance of these results. This test was performed 
only upon the first and second trials because of the 
very few times in which only one type of information 
was recalled for a slide on the subsequent trials. 
Additionally, a Chi-Square was calculated using the 
frequency expected by chance and the observed 
frequencies of Name and/or Extension Number only 
response over all sixteen slides on both the first and 
second trials.
Hypothesis 1:
The first hypothesis was concerned with the 
overall accuracy of recall for the five different 
information types and the two frequency levels. It was
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hypothesized that high frequency words would be 
recalled more accurately than low frequency words 
within each information category. It was also 
predicted that there would be a specific rank ordering 
of the different information types in terms of the 
amount correctly recalled.
The first two-way MANOVA, which did not include 
the Frequency variable, revealed main effects for 
Information Type (F(4,29)=200.98, pc.001), and Trial 
(F(4,29)=201.22, p<.001). The interaction between the 
two variables was also significant (F(16,17)=14.90,
P < .001). It was expected that the amount of correctly 
recalled information would increase over the trials 
because of practice with the stimuli.
An interaction, however, was not predicted but can 
easily be understood by an examination of Figure 1. As
Insert Figure 1 about here
can be seen in Figure 1, the interaction is caused by 
the different rate at which the Extension Number 
information is learned, as well as some minor overlaps
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between the other types of information. Extension 
Number information was predicted to be the least 
meaningful information that could be associated with a 
face. Thus it is easy to understand why the rate at 
which the subjects acquired this information was much 
slower then for the other information types. There was 
a trend for the four other information types to have a 
high rate of learning within the first three trials, 
while the rate of recall for Extension Numbers appears 
to only be increasing during the third or fourth trial.
The means of the number of correct responses of 
the five information types, over all five trials, 
indicated that the predictions concerning the rank 
order of the information types overall were not 
completely correct. As can be seen in Figure 2, the 
recall of Occupations (M=9.22) was no better than the
Insert Figure 2 about here
recall of Sports (M=9.23). However, the recall of both 
of these types of information was better then for 
Cities (M=7.12), which was slightly better than the
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recall for Names (M=6.83). Extension Numbers were 
recalled most poorly (M=2.14). The planned contrasts 
tested the significance of these differences. The 
first contrast, Occupations against Sports, was not 
significant (t(32)=0.02, p>.05). The second contrast, 
between the mean of the recall of Occupations and 
Sports against the recall of Cities, was significant, 
as predicted (t(32)=-7.13, p<.001). The third 
contrast, between the mean of recall of Occupations, 
Sports and Cities against the recall of Names, was also 
significant as predicted (t(32)=-5.01, p>.001). And 
finally, the contrast between the recall Extension 
Numbers and the recall of all else was also highly 
significant, as predicted (t (32)=-26.43, pc.001).
The other MANOVA, which excluded Extension 
Numbers, was performed basically to determine the 
significance of the Freguency variable, and whether it 
interacted with the either Trial and/or Information 
Type. This MANOVA also revealed a main effect for 
Information Type (F(3,30)=27.37, pc.001) and for Trial 
(F(4,29)=266.85, pc.001), as well as a significant 
interaction between Information Type and Trial
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(F (12 , 21) =3 . 31, pc .01). (As can be seen in these 
results, however, the removal of Extension Numbers from 
the analysis decreased the F value in both the main 
effect of type of information as well as in the 
interaction.) As predicted, this MANOVA also revealed 
a significant main effect of Frequency (F(1,32)=87.11, 
pc.001), and a nonsignificant interaction between 
Frequency and Information Type (F(3,30)=1.01, p>.05). 
The analysis, however, also revealed a significant 
interaction between Frequency and Trial 
(F(4,128)=12.56, pc.001) as well as a three-way 
interaction between Information Type, Frequency and 
Trial (F(12,21)=5.57, pc.001). These interactions can 
be understood by an examination of Figure 3.
As seen in Figure 3 there was a slight increase
Insert Figure 3 about here
in the difference between the recall of the low 
frequency words of each category, and overall as well, 
as the trials increase. (The high power inherent in
this repeated measures design allowed this small
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difference to reach significance.) High frequency 
words were always recalled more accurately than low 
frequency words on all trials, however. Thus, it 
appears that people continue to learn and recall high 
frequency words better than low frequency words as 
exposure increases. Since there was no overlap between 
the recall accuracy of high and low frequency words, 
however, these interactions do not weaken the main 
effects that are of interest to the study.
The means of the number of correct responses to 
the nine groups of combinations of frequency and 
information type (including Extension Number) indicate 
that the second part of this hypothesis was also not 
altogether accurate. As can be seen in Figure 4, the
Insert Figure 4 about here
recall of high frequency occupations (M=5.00) was not 
much different then the recall of high frequency Sports 
(M=5.08). These two groups were recalled better than 
low frequency Occupations (M=4.22) and low frequency 
Sports (M=4 = 15) as predicted. However, the recall of
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high frequency Cities (M=4.08) was less then these low 
frequency groups, as was the recall of high frequency 
Names (M=3.75). High frequency Names were recalled 
better than low frequency Names (M=3.08) low frequency 
Cities (M=3.03) and Extension Numbers (M=1.07) as 
predicted. The planned contrast tested the 
significance of the original hypothesized rankings. 
These contrast revealed that high frequency Occupations 
and Sports were not significantly different (t(32)=.46, 
p=.649), while Extension Numbers were recalled 
significantly lower than everything else (t(32)=-24.35, 
pc.001). The contrast between the high frequency words 
of all categories against the low frequency words of 
all categories was not significant (t(32)=-1.60, 
p=.12), showing that the predicted arrangement was not 
correct. Post-hoc T-Tests using a Bonferroni 
adjustment (with a stringent probability level of .0125 
for significance) were performed to determine the 
relative ranking positions of the rest of the groups. 
There was no significant difference between the recall 
of low frequency Cities and low frequency Names 
(t(32)=-.22, p=«825), while the recall of low frequency
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Cities was significantly lower than the recall of high 
frequency Names (t(32)=3.19, p<.0125). The recall of 
high frequency Names was not significantly different 
than the recall of high frequency Occupations (t(32)=- 
2.07, p = .047), which was greater than the recall for 
both high frequency Cities and low frequency Sports. 
There was also a significant difference between the 
recall of low frequency Occupations and high frequency 
Occupations (t(32)=-6.01, p<.001).
Hypothesis 2:
The second hypothesis stated that the recall of 
Names and Extension Numbers would be independent of the 
recall of the other types of information. This was 
tested by observing the number of Name and/or Extension 
Number alone response and comparing this total to the 
number of these responses that was expected to occur by 
chance. This analysis was performed only on the first 
two trials because of the few times in which only one 
type of information was recalled in later trials.
For the first trial, on slides in which at least 
one type of information was recalled (149 out of 528 
times), Name, Extension Numbers and the combination of
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Name and Extension Number were recalled with no other 
information only a few times (N=22). Significance 
tests were performed to judge whether they occurred as 
frequently as would be expected by chance if the recall 
of the different types of information was independent. 
To avoid making the assumption of independence between 
the responses for each slide in trial one, the 
frequency of Name and/or Extension Number only 
responses, expected by chance for each individual 
slide, was calculated. These expected results were 
compared to the actual observed results for the 
respective slide. A Sign Test was performed to 
determine the probability that the resulting 
discrepancies between the observed and expected 
frequencies of this type of response were due to 
chance. For the slides of trial 1, the observed 
frequency of Name and/or Extension Number only 
responses was less then the chance expectancy on 11 out 
of the 16 slides, with one being equal. This outcome 
was marginally significant (p=.058).
In addition, a planned Chi-Square, assuming 
independence between the individual slides, was
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performed to determine if these outcomes occurred 
significantly less than expected by chance overall for 
trial 1. Under this assumption of independence, Name 
and/or Extension Number only responses were 
significantly lower than the chance expectancy (X2(l, 
N=33)=38.23, p<.001). Table 1 displays the frequency 
expected by chance and observed frequencies for trial 1 
overall, as well as for the ten slides individually. 
Thus in both assuming independence between the slides,
Insert Table 1 about here
and in avoiding this assumption, the occurrence of Name 
and/or Extension Number only responses was less than 
expected by chance.
The same analysis was performed for the second 
trial. Out of the 355 slides for which some 
information was correctly recalled, Name and/or 
Extension Number only responses occurred only 15 times. 
The frequency expected by chance of these responses for 
each slide were calculated for this trial as well. In 
this trial, however, the chance expectancy was greater
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than the observed frequency for 15 out of the 16 slides 
(p<.001). Likewise, a Chi-Square was performed for the 
frequency of this response pattern for trial two 
overall. Again the observed frequency of Name and/or 
Number only responses was significantly less than 
expected (X2(l, N=33)=47.47,p<.001). Table 2 displays 
the chance expectancy and observed frequency of 
responses for the individual slides, as well as for 
overall, for Trial 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
A final note should be made about the pattern of 
recall exhibited by the different types of information. 
Since the answer sheets upon which the subjects wrote 
their responses simply had five blank spaces on which 
to write the recalled information, a measure of the 
order of recall, or at least of report, of the 
information was obtained. For those slides (N=225) in 
which all five types of information was recalled, Names 
were overwhelming reported in the first blank (N=181). 
All other types of information were recalled, on
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Insert Figure 5 about here
average, in the third to fourth space. Figure 5 shows 
the mean recall position of the five different groups.
Discussion
As hypothesized, the meaningfulness of the 
category had an effect on the recall of the 
information. The information from the more meaningful 
categories was recalled more accurately than the 
information from the less meaningful categories. Thus, 
as suggested by Cohen (1990), the strength of the 
association between a unit of information and a Person 
Identity Node is strengthened by increased 
meaningfulness, thereby facilitating the recall of this 
information.
The effects of the level of meaningfulness on the 
accuracy of recall are very similar to those found in 
the previous study (Vittoria, 1992). In the earlier 
study, however, the overall difference in recall for 
Names and Occupations was not great. In this earlier 
study, only monosyllabic names were used, while the
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other words used in the study were two syllables long. 
This difference may have provided a slight advantage 
for the recall of Names. In the present study, 
however, the words in all categories were two syllables 
long, and, as a result, the difference in the recall 
between Names and Occupations was much larger. In 
fact, the difference in the accuracy in recall between 
the two categories was similar to the findings of other 
studies in the field (McWeeny, Young, Hay & Ellis,
1987; Cohen, 1990). In the previous study by Vittoria 
(1992), a ceiling effect occurred in the later trials 
that caused a distortion of the overall difference 
between the recall of the different types of 
information. In the present study, however, 
additionally slides were included to increase the 
amount of information to be learned and thus increase 
the difficulty in the acquisition and retrieval of a 
specific unit of information. This increased 
difficulty eliminated the ceiling effect.
As predicted, the usage frequency of the stimulus 
words also had an effect on their recall in this study. 
Those words that were of high frequency within a
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category were recalled more accurately than those words 
of low frequency within the same category.
Additionally, there was some overlap between the High 
frequency words of a low meaningful category and the 
low frequency words of a higher meaningful category. 
Thus as suggested by Burton and Bruce (1992), the 
frequency of a word is an indirect measure of the 
strength and number of associations between the word 
and its associated Person Identity Node. However, this 
manipulation was not powerful enough to overcome the 
effect of category meaningfulness on the recall of the 
information. That is, the recall of most information 
from higher meaningful categories was higher, 
regardless of frequency, than the recall of information 
from lower meaningful categories.
Contrary to predictions made at the outset of this 
study, however, was the finding that Name and/or Number 
alone responses occurred less than expected by chance. 
This result was also similar to that found in the 
previous study (Vittoria, 1992). The reoccurrence of 
this phenomenon provides converging evidence of the 
association between the recall of Names and Numbers
The Effects of
50
with the prior recall of some more meaningful 
information.
There were, however, occasions in which there was 
a recall of a Name and/or a Number without the recall 
of other information. This result is also similar to 
that found in the first study. In the first study, 
however, there was a methodological artifact that put 
that finding into question. In the initial study, the 
answer sheets upon which each subject wrote their 
responses had blanks that were designated specifically 
for each type of information. These spaces were always 
listed in the same order with the blank for Names being 
first. This arrangement led to the question of whether 
the few Name only responses occurred because of the 
subjects attempt to fill in this first space to the 
detriment of the other spaces. In this follow-up 
study, however, the five spaces were not designated for 
any particular Information Type, and the subjects were 
asked to write down the information in the order in 
which they were recalled. The presence of the Name 
and/or Number only responses in this study provides 
convincing evidence for the possibility of recall of
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Names without recall of other types of information.
This answer sheet arrangement also enabled a 
measure of the recall order for the different 
Information types to be obtained. As discussed, on 
those trials in which all five Information Types were 
recalled, Names were reported in the first space 
overwhelmingly. This finding seems to contradict the 
finding of the lack of Name only responses just 
discussed. What this might indicate is a change in the 
connections between the Person Identity Node and 
individual Information Units from the time in which the 
different types of information are being learned to the 
time in which all has been successfully encoded. 
Personal experience suggests, for an individual who is 
well known, that the occupation of a person is not 
always recalled first. A possible explanation of both 
this personal experience as well as these empirical 
findings could be that the association between the Name 
and the Person Identity Node is not strong enough for 
activation when the Name is first being learned. Thus 
to access this word, a secondary route must be used. 
This route seems to be through the connection with
The Effects of
52
other information that has a stronger association with 
the Person Identity Node. After successive retrievals 
of the Name through this secondary route, the direct 
connection between the word and the Person Identity 
Node is strengthened to such an extent that a 
activation of the word can occur directly from the 
Person Identity Node. Because of the social practice 
to acknowledge others primarily by their names, the 
subjects report Names first, when they are able to 
directly retrieve these words.
Overall, these results provide conflicting 
evidence for both the Bruce and Young (1986) and Burton 
and Bruce (1992) models. The evidence for the effect 
of frequency and meaningfulness on the accuracy of 
recall provides evidence for the Interactive Activation 
and Competition Model of Burton and Bruce. However, 
this model doesn't provide a sufficient explanation of 
the repeated shortage of Name and/or Number only 
responses. The Bruce and Young model provides an 
explanation for a complete absence of these responses, 
but does not provide a reasonable explanation for the 
occurrence, albeit infrequent occurrence, of these
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responses.
Thus alterations to both of these models are 
required in order for either to provide an adequate 
explanation of the observed results. The Human Face 
Processing System must include some secondary route to 
name retrieval which bypasses its "Person Identity 
Node" (which contains occupational information). This 
alteration, however, would alter the Human Face 
Processing System in such a way that would cause it to 
be very similar to the Interactive Activation and 
Competition Model as proposed by Burton and Bruce.
Burton and Bruce assert that, in their model, 
there are no excitatory interconnections between 
different units within the Semantic Information Pool. 
"In contrast, the account presented here requires that 
all semantic information units are mutually inhibitory 
within pool. Although this seems rather odd, we should 
note that associated semantic information units are 
linked by excitatory routes, but these are via PINs"
(p.56). Thus Burton and Bruce provide a secondary 
route for the activation of semantic information, but 
do so almost as an afterthought. This method of
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retrieval, however, seems to be very important in the 
early stages of name learning and recall and thus needs 
to be more fully explained.
Additionally, this model mentions an explanation 
for the subsequent retrieval, or at least, report of 
Names prior to the report of other information. Burton 
and Bruce state that "we have said nothing about the 
output processes by which one may articulate names or 
words. Articulatory processes must follow activation 
elsewhere in the system" (p.58). Again however, Burton 
and Bruce have failed to provide an adequate 
explanation of a process that seems to be important for 
recall after learning has been complete. An 
explanation of this sort could include a socialization 
process that actually strengthens the connection 
between the Person Identity Node and the Name word to a 
level greater than that between the Person Identity 
Node and the occupation.
Future research that could help develop these 
theories should include a direct control of the amount 
and strength of each and every association made between 
a unit of information and a face. This could be
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achieved by creating non-word stimuli and presenting 
them to the subject in text as Occupations, Hobbies and 
Names. In this way, the experimenter could directly 
control the frequency of the occurrence of a word, as 
well as the temporal and semantic associations between 
different words. Following this controlled exposure, 
these non-words could be used as the biographical 
stimuli in a study with exactly the same design as the 
study reported here. The results of this study would 
provide evidence of whether there is a direct link 
between association strength and recall accuracy. Such 
findings would go a long way in developing an 
appropriate theoretical explanation of the empirical 
findings.
Future research could also empirically test the 
preliminary finding that Names are reported earlier 
after more extensive learning. This research could be 
accomplished by measuring the latency of name 
recognition as compared to occupation recognition 
following different levels of exposure to the stimuli.
A decrease in latency would provide evidence that the 
actual association strength between the face and the
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Name has increased. A steady recognition latency would 
indicate simply a change in reporting strategy in which 
the person just feels compelled to report the Name 
first, although they have recalled some other 
information first.
The results of this study, in conjunction with the 
previous one (Vittoria, 1992), have demonstrated the 
robustness of the association between the recall of 
Names and the recall of other information. This 
finding has provided important insight into the process 
of face identification. For this reason, it is 
imperative that elaborations and modifications be made 
to the existing model if it is to provide an adequate 
theoretical explanation for these findings.
The Effects of
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Table 1: Observed and Expected Frequencies of Name
and/or Extension Number Only Responses on 
Trial 1.
Expected Observed Difference
Slide 1 0.80 1. 00 +0.20
Slide 2 3 . 64 3 . 00 -0. 64
Slide 3 6.55 4 . 00 -2.55
Slide 4 1.30 0 -1.30
Slide 5 0. 88 1. 00 +0.12
Slide 6 2.55 2 . 00 -0. 55
Slide 7 2 . 80 0 -2 . 80
Slide 8 2.45 3 . 00 +0.55
Slide 9 0 0 0
Slide 10 0. 88 0 -0. 88
Slide 11 1. 52 0 -1.52
Slide 12 1.70 2 . 00 + 0.30
Slide 13 2 . 55 2 . 00 -0. 55
Slide 14 4 . 00 2 . 00 -2 . 00
Slide 15 2 . 10 1. 00 -1. 10
Slide 16 2.64 1. 00 -1. 64
Overall 40.25 22 . 00 -18.25
Sign Test, p=.058 
X2(l, N=33)=38.23, p<.01
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Table 2: Observed and expected Frequencies of Name 
and/or Extension Number Only Responses on 
Trial 2.
Expected Observed Difference
Slide 1 2 .55 2. 00 -0. 55
Slide 2 3 .55 1. 00 -2.55
Slide 3 3 . 64 1. 00 -2.64
Slide 4 2 .18 0 -2 .18
Slide 5 3.27 1. 00 -2.27
Slide 6 1.82 0 -1.82
Slide 7 1.82 0 -1.82
Slide 8 3 . 64 2 . 00 -1. 64
Slide 9 2 . 67 2 . 00 -0. 67
Slide 10 2 . 42 2 . 00 -0.42
Slide 11 3 . 03 1. 00 -2 . 03
Slide 12 2 .12 0 -2 .12
Slide 13 2 .18 0 -2 .18
Slide 14 3 . 64 1. 00 -2 . 64
Slide 15 1.91 2 . 00 +0.09
Slide 16 2.42 0 -2.42
Overall 48 . 07 15.00 -33.07
Sign Test, pc.001
X2(l, N=33)=47. 47 , pc.01
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Appendix B
Occupation Names Hometowns
Lawyer(269) Harry(91) Boston(74)
Teacher(155) Richard(64) Detroit(52)
Dentist(112) Eddie(49) Dallas(50)
Salesman(60) Robert(48) Cleveland(31)
Plumber(41) David(43) Pittsburg(3 0)
Farmer(25) Henry(38) Denver(28)
Chemist(23) Michael(30) Tampa(18)
Banker(21) Peter(25) Richmond(11)
Teller(1) Gilbert(1) Fresno(1)
Miner(1) Bradley(1) Scarsdale(1)
Busboy(1) Duncan(1) Duluth(1)
Butler(1) Felix(1) Polton(1)
Turner(1) Clayton(1) Monroe(1)
Miller(1) Robin(1) Bellaire(1)
Pressman(1) Alvard(1) Fairfield(1)
Joiner(1) Jody(1) Lemont(1)
Sport
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Numbers
High Frequency Baseball(360) 79
Tennis(329) 28
Soccer(160) 46
Hockey(13 0) 57
Lacrosse(107) 73
Wrestling(87) 35
Softball(31) 86
Boxing(23) 53
Low Frequency Climbing(1) 4 3
Riding(1) 92
Croquet(1) 57
Tumbling(1) 19
Curling(1) 67
Cricket(1) 94
Fencing(1) 8 3
Hunting(1) 3 2
Note: Number in parenthesis is the frequency of report
of the word by subjects (N=442) in Battig and Montague
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